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Abstract
Shoham et al. identify several important agendas which can help direct research in multi-agent learning. We propose two ad-
ditional agendas—called “modelling” and “design”—which cover the problems we need to consider before our agents can start
learning. We then consider research goals for modelling, design, and learning, and identify the problem of finding learning algo-
rithms that guarantee convergence to Pareto-dominant equilibria against a wide range of opponents. Finally, we conclude with an
example: starting from an informally-specified multi-agent learning problem, we illustrate how one might formalize and solve it
by stepping through the tasks of modelling, design, and learning.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Shoham et al. [1] propose several agendas for research into multi-agent learning, which we briefly summarize:
the computational agenda is to design algorithms which iteratively compute properties of games such as their Nash
equilibria. The descriptive agenda is to determine how natural agents such as humans make decisions, and predict
what those decisions will be. The normative agenda is to determine which learning algorithms are in equilibrium with
which other learning algorithms, and under what circumstances. And, the prescriptive agenda is to design learning
algorithms which allow agents to achieve high reward in practice. Shoham et al. split the prescriptive agenda into
cooperative and non-cooperative flavors, depending on whether the underlying environment gives all agents identical
rewards.
To these five agendas, we propose adding two more:
Modelling Determine how best to use the formal tools of multi-agent learning to describe real environments in which
we wish to act. What aspects of the environment are safe to ignore or simplify? When can we fall back on
simpler tools such as probabilistic inference, convex optimization, or combinatorial optimization to describe
parts of the decision-making problem without losing the essential properties of the multi-agent interaction?
Design Often we have some flexibility in setting up the problem to solve. For example, we might be able to give some
of the agents the ability to send messages to other agents, or to enter into some kinds of binding contracts.
How can we best use this flexibility to optimize criteria such as ease of learning, uniqueness of the final
learned policies, or predicted welfare of one or more of the agents?
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of a human playing a game, it will help if our formal model of the environment is similar to whatever internal model
the human uses. In this paper, though, we will focus on the connection to the prescriptive agendas: to build a practical
multi-agent system, we must model the world accurately and design away unnecessary complexity.
While there are few AI papers which specifically discuss modelling or design, any research which uses multi-agent
learning tools to solve a real problem must address both questions at least implicitly. For example, these problems
are covered to varying degrees in research on poker [2,3], robotic hide and seek and laser tag [4,5], distributed plan-
ning [6], RoboCup [7,8], the Trading Agent Competition [9–11], and economic modelling [12].
In the remainder of this article, we will start by fleshing out the modelling and design agendas in more detail. Then
we will consider possible goals for research into modelling, design, and learning. Finally, we will conclude with an
example: we will start from an informal specification of a learning problem and illustrate the steps one might use to
arrive at a detailed description of a multi-agent learning system.
2. Modelling and design
When writing software to help real agents decide how to act, we often have a fair amount of flexibility in how to
model the problem: we can decide which parts of the problem, and at what granularity, to treat as possible sources
of interesting interactions among agents. For example, suppose we are designing a team of robots to play Capture
the Flag. We could discretize the physical state space finely and represent the whole problem as one large partially-
observable stochastic game. In such a game, a player’s observations might be raw laser rangefinder readings, and its
actions might be to apply specified torques to its motors for specified amounts of time. Alternately, we could define
high-level abstract behaviors like “patrol” or “chase,” and have the players reason about their actions only at the level
of behaviors and behavior parameters. In principle, the most accurate description of the environment is the finely-
discretized low-level model. But, it is nearly impossible to work with such a detailed model using today’s computers
and algorithms; so, it is likely that a team based on the higher-level model would perform better in practice.
Unfortunately, there are few general techniques for partitioning the world into “decisions for which we really
should pay attention to the other agents” and “decisions where it doesn’t matter so much if we pretend the other
agents don’t exist.” (And in fact the distinction is not even so black and white as this: there are decisions for which we
will want to reason about a simplified model of another player, rather than a full model or no model.) So, we identify
as an agenda the problem of modelling: the discovery of engineering principles which allow us to determine when it
is safe to simplify or abstract away properties of the world or capabilities of other agents.
In addition to the flexibility we have in modelling, in real environments we can often influence the rules of the
game. For example, in the Capture the Flag example from above, we could equip the robots with wireless ethernet
cards and let them send messages to one another during the game, or we could accomplish a similar purpose with
signal lights or noisemakers. We could also tell the players useful information ahead of time, such as tie-breaking
rules or dispute resolution procedures. Even if we are building only a single robot which will play in pick-up games
with unknown teammates, we can try to design signals that our teammates will be able to learn to understand and take
advantage of. So, we identify the agenda of design: deciding how best to set up the playing field so that agents will be
able to learn to interact with one another in desired ways, or to encourage agents to adopt some behaviors and avoid
others.
3. Research goals
As mentioned above, we are particularly interested in modelling and design as they relate to the prescriptive agen-
das. So, by doing a good job of modelling and design, we hope to make it easier for our agents to learn to achieve
high rewards.
Unfortunately, the current state of the art for testing whether we have done a good job is to hand our model to
some learning agents and see how much reward they can earn. This sort of test isn’t a good way to draw general
conclusions: if the agents do poorly, we might have made bad modelling and design decisions, or we might just have
used bad learning algorithms. And even if one configuration of learning algorithms does well, we can’t say whether
its success would generalize to another configuration.
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than of individual algorithms. For example, a no-regret learner always achieves at least its safety value in a repeated
game. So, if we are able to ensure that all agents’ safety values are high, we can say that our model works well for
any set of no-regret learners. (And in fact we will use no-regret learners for this reason in the example of Section 4
below.)
Unfortunately, the performance guarantees for common classes of learning algorithms are too weak to make this
approach work well in many cases. So, we believe that an important research goal—which will advance at least
the modelling, design, and prescriptive agendas—is to identify learning algorithms that have stronger performance
guarantees against larger classes of opponents.
In particular, we believe that the most useful guarantee is one that is not very widely used: convergence to a Pareto-
dominant (or nearly Pareto-dominant) subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. We believe that this guarantee deserves
further research, both because it intuitively corresponds to what we might expect from a learning algorithm and
because it allows us to make specific predictions about the outcome of learning.
3.1. Performance guarantees
Various researchers have designed learning algorithms with different types of performance guarantees. For exam-
ple, Shoham et al. describe rational learning, originally defined by Kalai and Lehrer [13]. When two rational learners
play each other, if their priors are mutually absolutely continuous (a strong assumption), they are guaranteed to con-
verge to a Nash equilibrium.
For another example, Shoham et al. describe no-regret algorithms for repeated matrix games. These algorithms
bound how much they will wish they had played a constant action ai when looking back on past plays. This regret
bound implies, among other things, that no-regret learners achieve nearly their safety value in a repeated game no
matter what strategy their opponent follows.
For a final example, no-internal-regret algorithms [14] place guarantees on how much they will want to substitute
action ai for action aj when looking back on the history of past plays. No-internal-regret learners have all the same
guarantees that plain no-regret learners have; in addition, a set of no-internal-regret learners will always converge to
the play frequencies and payoffs of some correlated equilibrium in a repeated game.
Unfortunately, these and other similar guarantees are too weak for our purposes. To see why, consider the game
illustrated in Fig. 1, called repeated Battle of the Sexes or RBoS. RBoS is a repeated matrix game that models the
Fig. 1. Illustration of feasible values, safety values, equilibria, Pareto dominance, and the Folk Theorem for RBoS.
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prefers opera, the other prefers football, but they both prefer to go together: the one-step reward function is
O F
O 3,4 0,0
F 0,0 4,3
Player p wants to maximize her expected total discounted future value Vp; we discount rewards t steps in the future
by γ t = 0.99t . Fig. 1 displays the expected value vector (E(V1),E(V2)) for a variety of situations.
The shaded triangle in Fig. 1, blue where color is available, is the set of feasible expected-value vectors (for colors
see the web version of this article). Each of the points in this triangle is the expected-value vector of some joint policy
(not necessarily an equilibrium).
The single-round Battle of the Sexes game has three Nash equilibria. Repeatedly playing any one of these equilibria
yields an equilibrium of RBoS, and the resulting expected-value vectors are marked with circles in Fig. 1. Some
learning algorithms guarantee convergence of average payoffs to one of these points in self-play. For example, one
such algorithm is gradient descent in the space of an agent’s mixed strategies, since RBoS is a 2×2 repeated game [15].
Other algorithms, such as the no-regret learners mentioned above, guarantee that they will achieve at least the
safety value of the game. The safety values for the two players are shown as horizontal and vertical thin dashed lines.
So, two such algorithms playing against each other will arrive at a value vector somewhere inside the dashed pentagon
(cyan where color is available).
The Folk Theorem tells us that RBoS has a Nash equilibrium for every point inside this pentagon—that is, for every
feasible and individually rational value vector.1 So, algorithms which guarantee convergence to a Nash equilibrium of
the overall game will also end up inside the pentagon. For example, two rational learners with mutually-absolutely-
continuous priors yield this guarantee.
Finally, some combinations of algorithms, such as two no-internal-regret learners playing against one another,
guarantee that they will converge to the per-step payoffs of a correlated equilibrium of the one-step game. In Battle of
the Sexes, there is a correlated equilibrium for each point in the dashed pentagon in Fig. 1.
In RBoS, every one of the above guarantees leads to the same conclusion: each player is guaranteed a total expected
discounted payoff not much worse than her safety value of 166.67. And, it might be the case that no player gets much
more than 166.67.
We claim that the values (166.67,166.67) cannot reasonably be called a successful outcome of learning: to achieve
this level of payoff, the players can only wind up at the same event slightly less than half of the time, worse than if
they picked which event to go to uniformly at random. Instead, a truly successful outcome would be something like
the following: the players always go to an event together, alternating which event every weekend. This outcome is
much better both in terms of social welfare (the sum of expected values, 700 for the turn-taking solution vs. 333.33
for the safety values) and individual expected value for each agent ((350.25,349.75) vs. (166.67,166.67), if the first
player gets her preferred event on the first weekend).
3.2. Pareto dominance
We will say that an equilibrium, A, Pareto dominates another equilibrium, B , if all players achieve at least as high
a value in A as they do in B , and if at least one player does strictly better in A. The Pareto frontier is the set of
equilibria which are not Pareto dominated. The frontier for RBoS is the upper right edge of the dashed pentagon in
Fig. 1, marked in red where color is available.
If we can guarantee convergence to a point on or near the Pareto frontier, we can usually say much more about the
agents’ payoffs than we could with the weaker guarantees mentioned above. For example, in RBoS, every equilibrium
on the Pareto frontier gives each agent a total discounted payoff of at least 300, almost twice as much as the guarantee
from the safety values.
1 In fact, it guarantees something stronger: every feasible and strictly individually rational value vector corresponds to a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. In such an equilibrium all threats are credible: no agent wishes to deviate from her stated policy, even at states which can only be
reached after a deviation.
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successfully: at a Pareto-dominant point, there are no “missed opportunities” which would allow one agent to achieve
a higher payoff without hurting the others. Different points on the frontier might be better or worse for an agent, but
we can explain these differences as results of the agent’s skill or lack of skill at negotiation, rather than as failures of
learning. For example, if the football lover negotiates well, the players might choose (F,F ) often; but if they regularly
chose (F,O) or (O,F ) we would say that they hadn’t learned very well.
There are a few examples in the literature of algorithms that guarantee they will reach a Pareto-dominant equilib-
rium if all agents use them. For example, Powers and Shoham’s MetaStrategy [16] guarantees that it will reach a point
on the Pareto frontier in self-play in a repeated game, as does the modified no regret learning algorithm described in
the extended version of this paper [17]. (See also [18].) Both of the above algorithms depend on the assumption that
the environment is a repeated matrix game; there is no easy way to extend them to more general environments such
as stochastic games.
For another example, Brafman and Tennenholtz [19] define an “efficient learning equilibrium”, in which each agent
specifies a learning algorithm before seeing the game, and no agent would benefit very much by switching learning
algorithms after finding out the other players’ choices.2 They show the existence of a “Pareto ELE” for repeated
matrix games: that is, they give an ELE in which the players always choose a nearly Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
And, they extend the Pareto ELE result to stochastic games. However, their Pareto ELE can require the agents to make
side payments to one another, which is not practical in some environments (and which makes the problem of agreeing
on a Pareto-dominant equilibrium much easier). And, their equilibrium is not subgame perfect, which suggests that
rational agents might be motivated to deviate from it.
Finally, Murray and Gordon [20] describe a family of algorithms that guarantee that they will reach nearly Pareto-
dominant equilibria in stochastic games. These algorithms do not need side payments, but they do need “cheap talk”,
i.e., non-binding communication among agents. The resulting equilibria are subgame perfect, but in order to achieve
subgame perfection the algorithms assume that suitable punishment policies are provided as input (although a newer,
unpublished version of the algorithm relaxes this requirement).
3.3. Possible refinements
While the algorithms of Section 3.2 achieve better guarantees than many other multi-agent learners, these guar-
antees are still weaker in some ways than we might like. First, their bargaining style is inflexible: they essentially
make a single take-it-or-leave-it offer at the beginning of the game and then try to stick to it until the other player
capitulates. They achieve equilibrium in self-play simply because all players are designed to make the same offer.
We would rather see a learning algorithm which can accept ideas from other players in a back-and-forth negotiation
(while still, of course, avoiding Pareto-dominated outcomes).
Second, the Pareto frontier can be a big place. In a joint strategy on the Pareto frontier, some agents might only
receive their safety values. So, from an individual agent’s perspective, the guarantee of Pareto dominance doesn’t
always translate into a better lower bound on reward than do other guarantees such as no regret. (By contrast, from a
team’s perspective, the Pareto dominance guarantee is better than other bounds: unless the set of equilibria is trivial,
the social welfare of an outcome on the Pareto frontier is always better than the sum of the players’ safety val-
ues.)
Finally, the algorithms of Section 3.2 only guarantee Pareto dominance when playing against themselves or other
very similar learning algorithms. Since we don’t necessarily control the learning algorithms used by the other players,
it would be much better if we could find algorithms that needed only weak conditions on the other players to guarantee
a Pareto-dominant outcome. Unfortunately it is not clear what sorts of assumptions about the other players would allow
us to prove this stronger sort of guarantee.
2 Brafman and Tennenholtz consider a setting in which not only the behaviors of the other agents but also the payoffs of the underlying game
are initially unknown and must be learned. However, this setting is equivalent to the one considered here: we can augment the game with an extra
player, “Nature”, whose initially-unknown but fixed strategy determines the payoffs of the other agents.
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To illustrate the problems which arise in design and modelling, in this section we will work out an extended
example of a multi-agent learning problem and discuss the tradeoffs that result from various design and modelling
decisions. We will demonstrate techniques for modularization, factorization, and simplification, including:
• Engineering what the agents know about one another, to minimize the effect of partial observability while leaving
communication and planning problems manageable;
• Designing markets and negotiation systems to help resolve disputes; and
• Taking advantage of no-regret techniques to provide better guarantees for the learning and planning components
of an agent.
And, we will recommend different ways the agents can learn about one another.
Our example is one of supply chain management. A manufacturer has built its factory next to a set of warehouses
run by its suppliers. The manufacturer can build several different types of products in its factory; each of these products
is built from different parts and requires different machinery. Some of the machinery is permanently installed in the
factory, while other machinery requires setup time and cost to bring online, and may incur teardown time and cost
when no longer needed.
To save money, the manufacturer has no long-term storage space at its factory. Instead, it depends on the suppliers to
deliver parts directly to its assembly lines as they are needed. To facilitate this just-in-time delivery, the manufacturer
is willing to provide information about its operations to the suppliers. The exact nature of this information is a question
of design: we should provide enough information to allow the suppliers to choose good plans, but not so much as to
be unwieldy or to violate the manufacturer’s privacy.
To move parts around the complex, each supplier operates a fleet of robotic trucks. These trucks drive back and
forth among the warehouses and assembly lines, picking up parts and delivering them. Each supplier owns several
warehouses which stock various parts at various costs, and each part may be stocked at several warehouses. Suppliers
may or may not be willing to sell parts to their competitors. The part prices may fluctuate over time, but the suppliers
always know the current prices.
In this domain, learning is crucial: there are many equilibria with widely varying payoffs, so if the agents don’t
learn to cooperate with one another they may lose lots of money. For example, depending on how we set up the
problem, there can be an equilibrium which leaves the factory and all the trucks idle.
4.1. Assumptions about the manufacturer
If we were to try to model this problem exactly, its description would be very large: for example, the problem state
would include the locations and contents of all of the trucks, the manufacturer’s projected demand from its customers,
the setup of the manufacturer’s machinery, and the state of each partially assembled product in the factory. Worse,
most players would not know every bit of this information, and so would have to worry about making forecasts and
guessing what the other players’ forecasts are.
Instead, we will make a series of modelling assumptions and design decisions to simplify the problem while
retaining its essential features. If we make these decisions well, the problem will become much easier to solve. While
we don’t claim that our choices here are perfect, they illustrate one approach to making planning and learning tractable.
Our first assumption is that the manufacturer is not demand-limited: it can sell as many of its products as it can build,
at prices which are enough higher than the cost of materials to cover the players’ operating costs. This assumption
means, first, that the manufacturer doesn’t just want to shut down the factory, and second, that the manufacturer’s
demand forecasts are no longer important hidden state.
Our second assumption is that the process of manufacturing each product can be described by a graph like the one
shown in Fig. 2. To build this product, the manufacturer must start with part A. It can then continue by adding either
B or C. Once both B and C are in place, it can attach parts D and E in that order. Each of the parts is relatively bulky
and expensive, and takes some time to install. So, the manufacturer does not want to take delivery of a part unless it
is ready to use it; for the product of Fig. 2, the manufacturer would not buy part D unless it had a partial assembly
containing A, B , and C already.
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each supplier’s warehouses laid out along a line, only one part type per warehouse, capacity for only one part in each truck, and only one product
under construction at the factory. The product currently has parts A, B , and C installed, and the first supplier is about to deliver D.
4.2. A parts market
We are now in a position to make some design decisions about how the manufacturer interacts with the suppliers.
The goal of these decisions is to break the overall planning problem into separate, tractable pieces.
Our first design decision is to treat each robotic truck as a separate agent, whose goal is to make profit for its
owner. We will charge a truck when it picks up a part from a warehouse, and credit it when it delivers the part to the
manufacturer (or returns the part to a warehouse, should it decide it needs to switch cargoes). We will give each truck
the ability to communicate with all the other trucks in a common language, so that they can coordinate their deliveries.
Treating every truck as a separate agent risks the possibility that two trucks belonging to the same manufacturer
will unknowingly sabotage one another. This sort of destructive interaction might happen either because the trucks
failed to learn well (which we hope to avoid by using smart learning algorithms) or because one truck might achieve
an advantage for itself by hurting another truck (which we hope to avoid by designing our market well).
Our next design decision is how to let the manufacturer communicate with the suppliers so that it can buy the parts
it needs. Our goal here is to design a market that avoids the planning inefficiencies that can happen when the agents
lack necessary information about one another.
In order to design this market, we will make an additional modelling assumption. If the prices that the warehouses
pay for parts and the prices that the manufacturer receives for finished products were constant, the agents could follow
an open-loop plan for all time. If instead these prices change slowly, there will be an open-loop plan which the agents
will be happy to follow for many steps into the future. So, we will assume that prices change slowly enough that
the agents don’t lose much welfare by committing to an open-loop plan fairly far into the future. (The agents can
always, by mutual consent, edit the plan if prices do change enough to make it worthwhile.) Then, we will say that
the manufacturer and suppliers negotiate by jointly specifying an open-loop plan.
The agents can specify an open-loop plan by describing a delivery schedule for each truck along with the prices that
the manufacturer will pay for each delivery. (We’ll assume the manufacturer’s price must at least cover the part’s cost,
to avoid various sorts of shady dealings.) The full plan contains much more detail than this, but from the schedule and
prices each agent can plan independently and fill in how it needs to act: the manufacturer can optimize its assembly
operations, and each truck can optimize its delivery route.
4.3. Negotiation
With the above design decisions, we have greatly simplified the agents’ planning problems. For a fixed schedule
and prices, the agents are completely decoupled: the manufacturer can optimize its assembly schedule using some-
thing similar to a job-shop scheduler, and the trucks can optimize their delivery routes using something similar to a
travelling-salesman planner.
We can also greatly simplify the agents’ learning problems: we will design our market so that, instead of needing to
predict the other agents’ behavior in every possible state of the world, an agent only needs to predict which schedules
and price lists the other agents will agree to. In particular, we propose that the agents follow an alternating offers
bargaining game of the sort proposed by Rubinstein [21].
In our game, the players will take turns proposing agreements, with each agreement comprising a schedule and
a price list. After hearing a proposal, each player can compute a plan to achieve the proposed schedule, and decide
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agreement, and the process repeats. If the players continue to reject each others’ proposals, our rules will tell them to
give up at some point and follow a predefined default plan called the disagreement point; as designers, we can pick
this plan arbitrarily and tell the players what it is.
By specifying the details appropriately (see the extended version of this paper [17] or the similar algorithm in [20]),
we can guarantee that the unique equilibrium of this game is the Nash bargaining point, a point on the Pareto frontier
which Nash [22] suggested as a reasonable outcome of this sort of bargaining game. But even for boundedly rational
players, there is never an incentive to insist on an agreement that’s not on the Pareto frontier: while a computation-
limited agent might not be able to come up with a proposal on the Pareto frontier, it can at least recognize when one
proposal Pareto dominates another.
Another nice feature of our game for agents with limited computation is that it is comparatively easy for an agent
to propose a delivery schedule that it can comply with. So, a limited agent can run its planner for however long it
can afford, and make proposals based on the best schedule it finds. It can even incorporate ideas from schedules
previously proposed by other agents. Furthermore, learning can whittle down the set of schedules that each agent
needs to consider: for example, if one agent’s cost to supply part A is much higher than another’s, that agent should
be able to learn that it doesn’t need to consider schedules where it supplies many copies of part A.
4.4. Optimization
To conclude our example, we will consider one last possible opportunity for learning. As mentioned above, a fixed
schedule and price list allow the agents to plan independently and arbitrarily far into the future. But in reality, the
agents may realize at some point that they want to change their plans: some part prices may go up or down, or some
agent may discover a delivery schedule that leaves everyone better off.
We have assumed that the agents are free to renegotiate in such a circumstance. But, if this sort of renegotiation
happens frequently, the agents may regret planning under the assumption of a fixed schedule: for example, a truck
might be willing to pay a little bit more in order to avoid risks such as carrying expensive parts for long intervals or
driving to inconvenient locations.
To learn which sorts of plans are likely to work well even in the face of changing goals and costs, we can represent
an agent’s planning problem as an online convex program. For example, a simplified version of a truck’s planning
problem is a repeated travelling salesman problem with unknown edge costs: for each delivery the truck leaves the
manufacturer, picks up parts from some predetermined set of warehouses, and returns to drop them off at the manufac-
turer. (A more fully detailed version of the planning problem, including uncertainty about the next delivery deadline,
uncertainty about the cost for each part at each warehouse, and flexibility about where to pick up parts, is described
in the extended version of this paper [17].)
If we represent a tour with one indicator variable ei for each edge i ∈ E, then we can write X ⊆ {0,1}|E| for the
finite set of feasible tours. If c ∈R|E| is the (unknown) vector of edge costs, then the cost of a tour x ∈X is c · x. And,
if we pick a tour at random from some distribution P(x), the expected cost of our tour is EP (c ·x) = c ·EP (x) = c · x¯,
where x¯ ∈ convX is the mean of the distribution P .
Since we don’t know c ahead of time, we can try to learn a good distribution P(x) by observing samples of c:
we plan and execute a tour, observe how much it actually would have cost to traverse each edge on this round, and
then plan our next tour. Since the only property of P(x) that matters is its mean x¯ ∈ convX , and since our payoffs
are linear in x¯, choosing the best x¯ is an online convex program. (Randomization serves two purposes here: first, it
assigns a meaning to interior points of convX , and second (and more importantly), it allows us to avoid oscillations
caused by feedback among multiple learners whose actions influence each others’ costs.)
To solve this OCP, we can use any of a number of algorithms, such as Generalized Gradient Descent [23],
GIGA [24], Lagrangian Hedging [25], or Follow the Predicted Leader [26]. In this case FPL is particularly con-
venient and simple to describe: we keep track of the sum of all past cost vectors cT =∑T −1t=1 ct , and on iteration T we
choose
x¯T = arg min(cT + T ) · x (1)
x∈X¯
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salesman problem with known costs; we can solve this problem using any of the many search algorithms that have
been proposed for TSPs.
By learning which tour to take using a no-regret algorithm, we have guaranteed that our tours will cost not much
more than if we had known the true average edge costs ahead of time and chosen the best fixed tour. This guarantee
means that we can feel safe allowing the agents to renegotiate their plans frequently: individual agents will learn what
sorts of plans are risky, and act as if those plans are more costly when negotiating.
5. Discussion
We proposed the agendas of “modelling” and “design” to complement the five agendas identified by Shoham
et al. [1]. We then identified a research goal which could advance the modelling, design, and prescriptive agendas:
find learning algorithms that converge to a Pareto-dominant subgame-perfect equilibrium against a wide range of
opponents. Finally, we illustrated our ideas through an extended example. This example demonstrated several ways to
achieve near-Pareto-dominance with current algorithms: first, we factored our model so that the agents can conduct the
most important part of their negotiations up front and with negligible uncertainty. Second, we set up our negotiation
problem so that an agent’s best response to any reasonable opposing strategy is always on the Pareto frontier. And
finally, we handled residual uncertainty using no-regret learning.
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